Notre Dame Law Review Online
Volume 92 | Issue 1

Article 3

2017

Through the Looking Glass in Indiana: Mandatory
Reporting of Child Abuse and the Duty of
Confidentiality
Alberto Bernabe
The John Marshall Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alberto Bernabe, Through the Looking Glass in Indiana: Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse and the Duty of Confidentiality, 92 Notre
Dame L. Rev. Online 22 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online/vol92/iss1/3

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review Online by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

ESSAY

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS IN INDIANA:
MANDATORY REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE AND THE
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Alberto Bernabe*
INTRODUCTION
It is often said that the duty of confidentiality is the most important of
1
all the fiduciary duties attorneys owe their clients. This is so because
without confidentiality, clients would presumably not feel free to seek legal
representation, or at least, would not feel free to speak openly with their
2
lawyers. This notion is clearly the basis for the recognition of the duty,
which the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
© 2016 Alberto Bernabe. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review
Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. Professor Bernabe’s
Professional Responsibility blog is available at http://bernabepr.blogspot.com.
1 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’
ETHICS 129 (5th ed. 2016) (noting that the “[t]rust between lawyer and client is . . . the
‘cornerstone of . . . effective assistance of counsel,’ and fidelity to that trust is ‘the glory of
[the legal] profession’” (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212
(6th Cir. 1981); and then quoting United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24, 24 (C.C.D. Colo.
1889)); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.1 (1986) (“[B]oth sacred and
controversial, the principle of confidentiality of client information is well-embedded in the
traditional notion of the Anglo-American client-lawyer relationship.”).
2 As explained by the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976), “if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from
the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed
legal advice.” See also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 138 (stating that
“confidentiality is essential to candid disclosure of embarrassing and potentially harmful
truths from clients to their lawyers”); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 45–46 (2009).
22
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4

Conduct —the model for the rules in almost all American jurisdictions —
explain as follows:
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the
absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal
information relating to the representation. . . . This contributes to the
trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is
thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully
and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to
represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to
refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come
to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex
of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon
experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice
5
given, and the law is upheld.
6

Yet, confidentiality can be a double-edged sword. Protecting the
secrecy of certain information can be dangerous. For example, it may
7
create risks to others, prevent the conviction of guilty defendants, result in

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2015).
The rules of forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands are
based on the ABA Model Rules. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,
A M.
BAR
ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_o
f_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Sept. 7,
2016). Only California and Puerto Rico have not adopted the Model Rules. See id. For a
complete list of the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules, see id.
5 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
6 FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 130 (“No rule of law, no matter how
fundamental and explicit, has ever been unwavering or free of ambiguities, and the
protection of lawyer-client confidentiality is no exception.”)
7 GILLERS, supra note 2, at 46–47. There is a recurring debate over whether courts
should allow settlement agreements that prevent the disclosure of information that could
affect public safety. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 75–76 (2d ed. 2007) (asserting that “[m]any unsafe or
unlawful practices would come to light sooner if there were more legislative or ethical
prohibitions on . . . secrecy clauses”). For example, the issue was much discussed in the
media, including an episode of the television program 60 Minutes, in the wake of the news
that Firestone Tire Company had settled lawsuits involving defective tires preventing the
disclosure of the defects, which later caused injuries to others. See, e.g., Frances
Komoroske, Should You Keep Settlements Secret?, 35 TRIAL 55, 56 n.7 (1999) (citing
Williamson v. Superior Court, 582 P.2d 126 (Cal. 1978)); Richard Zitrin, The Fault Lies in
the Ethics Rules, 23 NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2001, at A-25; see also RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL
M. LANGFORD, Keeping it Secret (Or, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You), in THE MORAL
COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 183–208 (1999) (discussing secret settlement
agreements in the context of products liability).
3
4
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the conviction of innocent defendants, and prevent the disclosure of
9
information that could provide comfort or closure to victims.
Understanding this, the drafters of the ABA Model Rules also crafted many
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. In fact, many lawyers are
surprised to learn that, when added up, there are more than a dozen
10
recognized exceptions throughout the ABA Model Rules.
In addition,

8 The case involving Mr. Alton Logan, who in 1982 was wrongfully convicted for a
murder he did not commit, illustrates this point. Harold J. Winston, Learning From Alton
Logan, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 173, 173 (2009). In this case, the actual killer, Andrew
Wilson, confessed to his two attorneys but did not consent to disclosure of his confession in
order to exonerate Logan. Id. However, the attorneys convinced Wilson to consent to
disclosure after his death. Id. Unfortunately for Logan, Wilson lived for another twenty-six
years, during which Logan remained in prison, even though Wilson’s lawyers knew he was
innocent. See id. Logan was released from prison in 2008. Id. Logan’s case and the issues
it raises are discussed in Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should Be a
Wrongful Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 391, 391 (2008) (citing 60 Minutes: 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man in Prison
(CBS
television
broadcast
Mar.
9,
2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/06/60minutes/main3914719.shtml (last updated
May 23, 2008)); Gary Rowe, Potential Expansion, or Modification, to the Permissive
Exceptions of Model Rule 1.6: Client-Lawyer Confidentiality in Criminal Law and “The
Gap,” 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 291, 291–92 (2015); Ken Strutin, Preserving Attorney-Client
Confidentiality at the Cost of Another’s Innocence: A Systemic Approach, 17 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 499, 511–14 (2011); Adam Belsey, Note, When Innocence is
Confidential: A New and Essential Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 56 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 147, 149–53 (2016).
9 The famous “buried bodies case” of the 1970s is still the best example of this
concern. The case involved two lawyers who knew the location of their client’s victims but
did not disclose the information until much later. See People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798,
799–800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). One of the
lawyers, Francis Belge, was charged with a violation of a public health statute, but the court
dismissed the charges in an opinion that emphasized the importance of the concept of
confidentiality. Id. at 803. Belge was quoted stating, “[K]nowing how the parents must
feel, [we] wanted to advise them where the bodies were . . . . But since it was a privileged
communication, we could not reveal any information that was given to us in confidence.”
Slayer’s 2 Lawyers Kept Secret of 2 More Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 20, 1974),
http://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/20/archives/slayers-2-lawyers-kept-secret-of-2-morekillings-two-attorneysfor.html?url=http%3A%2F%2Ftimesmachine.nytimes.com%2Ftimesmachine%2F1974%2F
06%2F20%2F79872271.html%3Faction%3Dclick&region=ArchiveBody&module=LedeAs
set&pgtype=article&contentCollection=Archives, reprinted in RICHARD A. ZITRIN ET AL.,
LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 119–20 (4th ed. 2013). The story behind this case
has been told in numerous publications, including a book written by the other lawyer
involved in the case, Frank Armani. See TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK ARMANI, PRIVILEGED
INFORMATION (1984); see also RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL LANGFORD, Buried Bodies: Robert
Garrow and His Lawyers, in THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 7–26 (1999).
10 Most of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality are in Rule 1.6 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, but there are additional exceptions recognized in Rules 1.13
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special statutes that impose an opposite duty—a duty to disclose
information under certain circumstances—can affect the duty of
confidentiality. Most common among this type of statute are state statutes
that mandate disclosure of information related to child abuse. All
American jurisdictions have enacted such statutes, but they vary greatly in
11
the details.
As one might expect, therefore, there may be circumstances in which a
lawyer may find a conflict between the duty to keep information secret and
the duty to disclose it. Assume, for example, that a lawyer learns through
the representation of a client that the client, or someone else for that matter,
has engaged or is engaging in sexual abuse of a minor. Assuming the
information is confidential as defined by the applicable rules of
professional conduct, does the lawyer have a duty to keep the information
secret, or a duty to disclose it under the state’s disclosure statute? The
answer may vary from state to state and will likely depend on the specific
language of the reporting statute and the rules of professional conduct in
the particular jurisdiction. Yet, unfortunately, due to recent State Bar
activity, the answer in Indiana is now even more confusing.
In 2015, the Legal Ethics Committee of the Indiana State Bar
Association issued an Opinion (the “Opinion”) addressing a lawyer’s duty
to conceal or disclose information regarding sexual abuse of a minor. It
concluded that, under Indiana law, absent client consent, an attorney may
not report information about suspected child abuse learned during the
representation of the client unless the lawyer believes disclosing the
information is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
12
bodily harm.
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Committee
disregarded the text of the applicable Rule of Professional Conduct and did
not consider the possible scenarios that could result from its interpretation
of Indiana’s mandatory disclosure statute, the doctrine of the attorneyclient privilege, and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
In the end, the recent Committee Opinion creates confusion and
defeats the purpose of providing guidance to lawyers about their ethical
obligations. In an effort to clarify this confusion, this Essay will explain
the issue presented by the Opinion and will suggest the analysis needed for

and 3.3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2, 1.13, 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2015).
11 All fifty states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have enacted statutes mandating
disclosure of child abuse. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 1 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [hereinafter
MANDATORY REPORTERS].
12 See Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Opinion No. 2 of 2015, 59 RES
GESTAE 24, 24 (2015).
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its proper resolution according to the Indiana Rules of Professional
Conduct. Part I of this Essay will briefly discuss the issue of child abuse in
the United States, which has led many states to restructure or rethink their
reporting obligations and confidentiality laws. Next, Part II will outline the
Indiana Ethics Committee’s Opinion, highlighting the flaws in the
Committee’s reasoning in light of the plain text of Indiana’s mandatory
reporting statute and Rules of Professional Conduct. Part III will then
analyze the Opinion in light of the interplay between this mandatory
reporting statute and the duty of confidentiality, as laid out in the Rules of
Professional Conduct. In so doing, it will show that the conclusion reached
by the Ethics Committee in its recent Opinion is unsubstantiated by the
law. The Essay will conclude by providing a four-step analysis that
attorneys should follow to determine whether the duty of confidentiality
applies in a given situation.
I.

CHILD ABUSE AND REPORTING DUTIES

Over the years, there have been enough recurring reports of child
abuse throughout the United States—whether involving clergymen,
educational institutions, or just individuals—to support the statement that
13
child abuse is a major societal problem.
Back in the 1980s, it was
reported that state child protective agencies received more than one million
complaints of child abuse and neglect that resulted in demonstrable harm
14
every year. A report in 2004 estimated that almost ten percent of students
“in public schools experience some form of educator sexual misconduct,
15
ranging from offensive comments to rape.”
More recently, an article
published in May 2016 by the same team of Boston Globe journalists that
16
produced the story behind the movie Spotlight
highlighted an
13 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Thank You, Penn State, VERDICT (May 12, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/05/12/thank-penn-state (asserting that when the Sandusky
scandal broke, it proved to the world that the issue of institution-based child sex abuse is a
society-wide problem, not one isolated to particular institutions).
14 Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client
Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 203–
04 (1992) (citing NAT’L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CD-11794, STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND
PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 1988, at 7-1 (1988)).
15 Katharine Q. Seelye, Prep Schools Wrestle with Sex Abuse Accusations Against
Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/us/prepschools-wrestle-with-sex-abuse-accusations-againstteachers.html?emc=edit_th_20160418&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=69110943&_r=2.
16 Spotlight is a 2015 film that depicts a Boston Globe team of journalists’
investigation into cases of widespread and systemic child sex abuse in the Boston area by
numerous Catholic priests. SPOTLIGHT (Open Road Films 2015). For more information
about the story and the film, see the articles collected in The Story Behind the ‘Spotlight’
Movie, BOS. GLOBE, http://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/movies/spotlight-movie#spotlight
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investigation that revealed more than 200 victims, and at least ninety legal
17
claims involving at least sixty-seven schools in New England. Yet, the
problem is difficult to confront, in part, because of the helplessness of the
victims who most often do not report the offending conduct.
In an attempt to improve the detection of abuse, all states and U.S.
territories have enacted some version of mandatory child abuse reporting
18
laws. Yet, the details vary greatly among them, some applying only to
19
specific categories of people, others being more general, and some
20
recognizing exceptions to protect confidentiality duties or legal rights.
Legal professionals are not often mentioned among those who are
21
mandated reporters of child abuse. In addition, the mandatory reporting
22
statutes in most jurisdictions do not abrogate the attorney-client privilege.
Although some have argued that preserving the applicability of the
23
privilege does not technically dispense of the duty to report, it is
(last visited Sept. 7, 2016); Meredith Goldstein, How the ‘Spotlight’ Movie Got Made, BOS.
GLOBE (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/names/2015/10/30/howspotlight-movie-got-made/wXVXUiYPkoF3hEP9K4dydP/story.html.
17 Jenn Abelson et al., Private Schools, Painful Secrets, BOS. GLOBE (May 8, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/05/06/private-schools-painfulsecrets/OaRI9PFpRnCTJxCzko5hkN/story.html (reporting on more than 200 victims and at
least ninety legal claims involving at least sixty-seven private schools in New England).
18 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19 “[F]orty-eight states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands designate professions whose
members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment.” MANDATORY REPORTERS,
supra note 11, at 2. The most common professions listed are social workers, teachers,
school administrators, physicians, nurses, counselors, therapists, childcare providers, and
law enforcement officers. Id.
20 See id. at 3–4.
21 See id. at 2. However, there is uncertainty regarding the classification of lawyers
who work as professors in law school, and, in particular, those who supervise student legal
clinics.
22 See id. at 3; see also Mosteller, supra note 14, at 223–24.
23 See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 224–35. The attorney-client privilege gives a
client the right to prevent his or her lawyer from disclosing certain information in a
proceeding in which the rules of evidence apply. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 6.3.4, at
253; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 86 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (privilege can be invoked “[w]hen an attempt is made to introduce evidence or
obtain discovery” of a privileged communication). Reporting to a child welfare agency is
not disclosing information within a proceeding where the rules of evidence apply.
Presumably, therefore, a lawyer could be obligated to report the information, and still be
able to raise the privilege in an evidentiary proceeding in order to prevent the admission of
evidence regarding the communication. In other words, the state could force the lawyer to
provide the information in order for the state to investigate, but could not force the lawyer to
testify about it in a judicial proceeding. Thus, according to this interpretation, the obligation
to report would not eliminate the availability of the privilege. Also, the privilege only
covers information provided in confidence by the client to the attorney for the purpose of
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commonly thought that preserving the privilege means that lawyers are not
required to report information that would otherwise be protected by the
24
privilege.
25
In contrast, Indiana is one of just a few states that have enacted a
mandatory child abuse disclosure statute that imposes a duty to disclose on
26
27
everyone; and “everyone” presumably includes practicing lawyers. On
the other hand, subject to some exceptions, Rule 1.6 of Indiana’s Rules of
Professional Conduct (the “Rule”) imposes a duty of confidentiality that
28
covers all information related to the legal representation. Thus, it is not
surprising that the conflict that could potentially result from these two
general principles prompted the Ethics Committee to address this matter in
an Opinion.

obtaining legal representation. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, § 6.3.2, at 251 (“The attorneyclient privilege is not a rule protecting privacy per se, but only privacy in the context and for
the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to a legal adviser by one seeking legal services.”).
If the attorney obtains the information about the child abuse from a third party, or from the
client but in the presence of a third party, the information is confidential but not covered by
the privilege. See id. § 6.3.6, at 262 (“Communications from a nonclient . . . are outside the
attorney-client privilege.”); id. § 6.3.7, at 264 (explaining that the attorney-client privilege
does not extend to statements made in the presence and hearing of a third party because such
communications involve “an aura of nonconfidentiality”). In such a case, the attorney
would have to disclose the information even if the statute stated that attorneys do not have a
duty to report privileged information. See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 240. However, the
obligation to report can defeat the policy behind the privilege in that it would affect the
client’s trust and openness to discuss unfavorable information with the attorney. See id. at
230–31 (“Even if the state is ultimately prohibited from calling the lawyer as a witness at
the client’s trial, the major damage would have been done, and the promise of secrecy . . .
would prove ineffective in facilitating open and free confiding of sensitive information. . . .
[and] if statements made by a client are known to be subject to mandatory disclosure . . . the
privilege is wholly destroyed.” (footnotes omitted)).
24 See MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 11, at 2.
25 Eighteen states and Puerto Rico require any person who suspects child abuse or
neglect to report. Id. at 2.
26 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2016); see also id. § 31-33-22-1(a) (stating that
a failure to report is a misdemeanor); MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 11, at 22; Ind.
State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12.
27 See Donald R. Lundberg, Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting by Lawyers, 55 RES
GESTAE 31, 31 (2011) (noting that the mandatory reporting statute says all individuals who
have reason to believe that a child is a victim of sexual abuse have a duty to report and
“lawyers are ‘individuals’ for mandatory child abuse reporting purposes”).
28 See
IND.
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT
r.
1.6
(2016),
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/prof_conduct/#_Toc418253513.
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INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS COMMITTEE OPINION NO.
2 OF 2015

The Opinion began by stating the specific question it sought to
address: “If a lawyer learns, while representing a client, that a child is a
victim of abuse or neglect, must the lawyer make a report to the Indiana
29
Department of Child Services or local law enforcement?” As the Opinion
explained, the mandatory reporting statute in Indiana (the “Statute”) is
broadly phrased, stating that any “individual who has reason to believe that
a child is a victim of child abuse or neglect” is obligated to immediately
make a report to the Department of Child Services or to the local law
30
enforcement agency.
Making no explicit exceptions for lawyers, the
Statute appears to require lawyers to disclose confidential information,
which led the drafters of the Opinion to conclude that there is “a conflict
between the lawyer’s ethical duty to keep silent and the apparent duty to
31
speak.” Yet, as discussed below, a careful reading of the Indiana Rules of
Professional Conduct shows this supposed “conflict” does not really exist.
Having concluded that the Statute and Rules of Professional Conduct
present a conflict for lawyers, the Committee proceeded to seek a solution
to the conflict, concluding that lawyers must not comply with the Statute
unless complying is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
32
substantial bodily harm. Although based on good intentions, the analysis
underlying this conclusion is flawed.
The Committee began this analysis with the broad assertion that
because the Indiana Constitution recognizes that the Indiana Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over attorney discipline and the authority to regulate
the legal profession, recognizing that the Statute imposes a duty on lawyers
33
would violate the principle of separation of powers. According to this
argument, a statute that imposes a duty on lawyers would be
unconstitutional because the Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from
interfering with the Judiciary’s authority to regulate the legal profession.
There are a number of flaws in this argument. First, although it is true
that the Indiana Supreme Court has the authority to regulate the legal
profession, that authority is not necessarily exclusive. There are many
34
statutes that regulate the profession both directly and indirectly, as do
35
doctrines related to malpractice and contract law. The fact of the matter
Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12, at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-43-1-1 (West 2016) (prohibiting practice of law by
non-attorneys).
35 See, e.g., id. § 33-43-1-3 (describing the duties of an attorney).
29
30
31
32
33
34
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is that the legal profession is highly regulated by a combination of sources
of authority including court decisions, legislation, and administrative
regulations. As explained by noted legal ethics author and professor
Stephen Gillers, “many of the rules governing the behavior of lawyers do in
fact come to us not from a code of ethics but from court decisions (in the
areas of malpractice, fiduciary duty, tort, and agency law among others),
36
legislation, and agency rules.” If the Committee’s argument were correct,
as long as the Rules of Conduct were adopted under the authority of the
Indiana Supreme Court, the Legislature could never adopt legislation or
rules to regulate any aspect of the legal profession.
In support of the second part of its conclusion, the Committee simply
repeated the policy reasons behind the duty of confidentiality. The
Committee reiterated that “requiring lawyers to protect their client’s
37
confidences likewise protects the attorney-client relationship,” that if
forced to disclose confidential information clients will likely withhold
38
information, and that a betrayal of a client’s trust could result in
39
“irreversible harm to the client’s relationship to any attorney.”
Based on this general policy behind the duty of confidentiality, the
Committee then attempted to reach a compromise. As explained in the
Opinion, the compromise position is that lawyers have a duty to disclose in
certain cases and a duty not to disclose in all others. The Committee
explained its conclusion as follows:
[T]he Committee believes a lawyer must report that a child is a victim
of abuse or neglect “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm.”
Initially, the constitutional conflict mentioned above is no longer
present, as the Supreme Court, through the Rules of Professional
Conduct, specifically authorizes lawyers to disclose client information
in such situations. More significantly, while the prudential concerns
(harm to the attorney-client relationship chief among them) remain,
Rule 1.6 “recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity
and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm.” The reasons for “exempting”
attorneys from the general reporting rule being, in such situations, either
nullified or substantially negated, the general reporting requirement
40
applies, and lawyers must report.

Interestingly, the first part of the Committee’s conclusion—that
lawyers must disclose confidential information to the extent the lawyer
36 GILLERS, supra note 2, at 3 (“So-called codes of ethics . . . are just one part . . . of
the regulatory architecture for lawyers.”).
37 Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12, at 25.
38 Id. at 27.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
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believes reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm—is correct, but not for the reasons suggested in the
Opinion. The Committee based this conclusion on the argument that the
duty of confidentiality essentially supersedes the Statute, and since the
Rules of Professional Conduct recognize “the overriding value of life and
physical integrity,” the duty of confidentiality must require disclosure
under circumstances where disclosure could prevent death or substantial
41
harm.
The Committee’s argument misinterprets what the Rule says and
substitutes its text with what the Committee would like it to say. Even
though part of the policy behind the exception to the duty of confidentiality
is the recognition of the value of life and physical integrity, the Rule does
not impose a duty to disclose. Even in cases of possible death or
substantial bodily harm, whether to disclose is always left to the discretion
42
of each attorney. The Rule states that “[a] lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary” to “prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
43
bodily harm,” and, as the Rules themselves also explain, rules that use
“the term ‘may,’ are permissive and define areas . . . in which the lawyer
44
has discretion to exercise professional judgment.” Most importantly, the
Rules also state that as to rules that use the term “may,” “[n]o disciplinary
action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within
45
the bounds of such discretion.”
Thus, it is wrong to assume, as the
Committee appears to have done, that the Rules of Professional Conduct
impose a duty to disclose in order to prevent death or substantially bodily
harm. Maybe that is what the Rule should say; maybe it is what the
46
Committee would prefer it to say. But it is not what the Rule does say.

Id. (quoting IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6)
See IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at scope 14.
Id.
A better argument in support of the Committee’s conclusion can be found in
Section 63 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which suggests that,
even though a lawyer’s duty not to disclose confidential information is superseded when the
law specifically requires disclosure, a lawyer has a duty to resist the disclosure of
confidential information if there is a non-frivolous argument that the law does not require
the lawyer to disclose. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 63
cmts. a–b (AM. LAW INST. 2000). The problem with this argument, however, is that the
Restatement concedes that the duty of confidentiality would be superseded by a mandatory
reporting statute that applies to lawyers and that in such a case, the argument against the
duty to disclose under the statute, although not frivolous, would be significantly weakened.
41
42
43
44
45
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INTERPLAY BETWEEN INDIANA’S DISCLOSURE STATUTE AND RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Ironically, the Committee’s conclusion is actually correct for the
opposite reason it seems to embrace. Given the interplay between the
mandatory disclosure statute and the Rules of Professional Conduct,
lawyers must disclose information regarding child abuse because the
47
48
Statute says they must, not because the Rules do so. In other words, the
Statute imposes a duty to disclose, whereas the Rules allow lawyers to
comply with that duty. Since the duty to disclose imposed by the Statute is
mandatory, the net effect is that, unless they want to face criminal
49
charges, lawyers are obligated to disclose.
For the same reason, however, the Committee’s other conclusion—
that attorneys are barred from disclosing confidential information in all
other cases—is wrong. This is so because Rule 1.6(b)(6) of the Indiana
Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes that a lawyer may disclose
50
confidential information to comply with other laws.
In other words,
according to the clear text of the Rule itself, under circumstances that do
not involve possible death or substantial harm, a lawyer can comply with
the mandatory disclosure statute without violating the duty of
confidentiality.
In the end, the language in both exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality recognized in the Rules shows that the Committee erred in
concluding that there is a conflict between the Statute and the Rules of
Professional Conduct. In fact, there is no such conflict at all. The Statute
51
says a lawyer must disclose, and the Rules say the lawyer can do so.
Disclosing under those circumstances (either because there is risk of death
or substantial harm, or simply because the statute requires it) does not
47 See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2016) (“[A]n individual who has reason to
believe that a child is a victim of child abuse or neglect shall make a report as required by
this article.”).
48 For a discussion of the relationship between state reporting statutes and the rules of
professional conduct, see Mosteller, supra note 14, at 238 (stating that the command that a
lawyer keep information confidential as part of her professional responsibility cannot
supersede an otherwise mandatory legal duty to report, so the lawyer is obligated to report
abuse if learned from sources outside the attorney-client privilege).
49 See IND. CODE § 31-32-22-1 (stating that failure to report on child abuse as required
by the statute is a Class B misdemeanor).
50 IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (“A lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary . . . to comply with other law or a court order.”).
51 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A
STUDENT’S GUIDE § 1.6-12, at 290 (2012–2013) (“If disclosure is permitted or required
under state law, such as a child abuse reporting statute, one would think that the state policy
promoting disclosure would override a general confidentiality rule. But, given the exception
under Rule 1.6(b)(6), such analysis is not needed.”).
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constitute a violation of the ethical duty to keep the information
52
confidential. Thus, by concluding that, other than in cases of reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm, a lawyer cannot report the relevant
information when the Rules say the lawyer can report, the Committee’s
interpretation of the Rule is now in conflict with its actual text.
Given that the Indiana mandatory disclosure statute does not state
whether attorneys are exempted from the duty to disclose, nor whether it
abrogates the attorney-client privilege, there are three possible
interpretations of the interplay between the Statute, the attorney-client
privilege, and the duty of confidentiality in the Rules of Professional
Conduct. However, as shown below, the Committee’s Opinion, reaches a
conclusion that is not compatible with any of the possible interpretations.
The first way to interpret the state of the law is that the Statute applies
to lawyers but does not abrogate the attorney-client privilege. In such a
case, there are two possible results. In the first instance, lawyers would be
mandated to report abuse of children, but such information would not be
admissible in evidence in proceedings during which the client could raise
the privilege. In the second one, lawyers would not be mandated to report
because the recognition of the attorney-client privilege would be
interpreted to mean that there is no duty to disclose under the Statute.
In the first of these two scenarios, once it is accepted that lawyers
have a duty to disclose under the Statute, it follows that they would be
allowed to do so without violating the ethical duty of confidentiality,
because Rule 1.6 recognizes an exception to comply with statutes,
regardless of whether there is a risk of death or substantial harm. The
Committee’s conclusion is incompatible with this because it limits the duty
to disclose to cases of a risk of death or substantial harm, instead of
recognizing that the duty to disclose would apply in all cases.
In the second scenario, lawyers would not be required to disclose
under the Statute but would be allowed to do so at their discretion under the
exception that states that lawyers may disclose to the extent they deem
reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
harm. The Committee’s conclusion is incompatible with this analysis
because it states that attorneys have a mandatory duty to disclose under
such circumstances. That conclusion is not supported by the text of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
Finally, the third possibility is to hold that the Statute applies to
lawyers and that the privilege is abrogated. Obviously, this would mean
52 See Megan M. Smith, Note, Causing Conflict: Indiana’s Mandatory Reporting
Laws in the Context of Juvenile Defense, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 439, 451–52 (2014) (“[I]t
appears that an attorney would be excepted from keeping confidential information
pertaining to the abuse of a child because child abuse is a crime that could result in death or
substantial bodily harm, and the mandatory reporting laws requiring any individual to report
meet the exception for complying with another law.”).
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attorneys have a duty to disclose under the Statute and that the Rules of
Professional Conduct would allow them to do so regardless of whether
there is a risk of death or bodily harm under the exception that allows
attorneys to disclose confidential information to comply with “other laws.”
Since the Rules allow attorneys to comply with the other law, and the other
law imposes a mandatory duty to disclose, under this interpretation,
attorneys would have a mandatory duty to disclose in all cases. Again,
since the Committee concluded there is only a duty to disclose in some
cases, its conclusion is inconsistent with the proper analysis of the doctrine.
IV.

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMITTEE’S OPINION

Because it reinterprets the Statute and the Rules of Professional
Conduct to say something they do not say, the Committee’s Opinion may
produce a number of regrettable consequences. First and foremost, the
Opinion generates confusion as to what the duty of a lawyer is. As stated
above, the Opinion set out to answer a specific question: “If a lawyer
learns, while representing a client, that a child is a victim of abuse or
neglect, must the lawyer make a report to the Indiana Department of Child
53
Services or local law enforcement?” The Committee says the lawyer has
a duty to keep the information confidential except in cases where disclosure
is reasonably necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily injury. Yet,
the Rules say the lawyer can disclose to satisfy the mandatory disclosure
statute.
As a result, in a case in which disclosure is not necessary to prevent
death or substantially bodily injury, if a lawyer follows the Committee’s
conclusion and does not disclose, the lawyer may be found to be in
violation of the Statute and charged with a misdemeanor. The Committee’s
54
Opinion, which does not have the force of law, would not be a bar to such
55
prosecution. If, on the other hand, the lawyer discloses to comply with
the Statute, the lawyer may be found to have acted in violation of an ethical
duty and be subject to discipline—including disbarment—if the state
disciplinary authorities agree with the Committee’s interpretation. Finally,
lawyers who disclose information because they disagree with the
Committee’s interpretation that there is a duty not to disclose under the
Statute may open themselves to civil claims for negligence or breach of
fiduciary duty.
Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 12, at 24.
The opinion itself starts by reminding readers that it is only advisory in nature and
does not have the force of law. See id.
55 David L. Hudson, Jr., Conflicted Over Confidentiality: Indiana Ethics Opinion
Says Lawyers Not Always Obligated to Report Child Abuse, 35 CHILD L. PRAC. 42, 43
(2016) (Hudson quotes Professor Peter A. Joy of the Washington University School of Law
in St. Louis, stating, “The ethics opinion does not and could not bar such a prosecution, and
the opinion even states at the start that it ‘does not have the force of law.’”).
53
54

2016]

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS IN INDIANA

35

One would think that lawyers would abide by the Statute and then
argue, if necessary, that the Rules of Professional Conduct allow the
disclosure. But, because of the Committee’s Opinion, lawyers may fear
they will be subject to sanctions or civil lawsuits if they disclose the
information. Thus, oddly, the Opinion needlessly puts at risk the safety of
56
both children and attorneys at the same time.
CONCLUSION
When Alice, the main character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the
Looking-Glass, walks through a mirror into an alternative reality, she finds
57
herself in a world where things and words, appear, to her, to be reversed.
Something like that seems to have happened in Indiana, where the Ethics
Committee of the State Bar Association announced that a permissible duty
under the Rules of Professional Conduct was a mandatory duty, and that, at
the same time, conduct that used to be permissible would no longer be
allowed. In this alternative reality created by the Committee, lawyers have
a duty to disobey a mandatory statute—thus, a duty to commit a
misdemeanor—and a duty to keep secret information the Rules allow them
to disclose.
Hopefully, something can be done to walk back from the other side of
the mirror. Once back, the Committee should withdraw the Opinion and
reconsider strategies to achieve a more satisfactory result than the one
58
promoted by the current state of the law. Evidently, Indiana has taken the
view that maximizing the efforts to help victims of child abuse is more
important than protecting the policy behind the need for confidentiality
within the attorney-client relationship. However, although excepting
lawyers from the statutory duty to disclose will eliminate one possible
source of information needed to provide help for abused children, it could
also be argued that preserving the confidentiality of the information
59
disclosed within the attorney-client relationship is the better policy. The

56 See id. (quoting Professor Joy saying, “In my opinion, any lawyer in Indiana who
relies on this ethics opinion would be going out on a limb if the lawyer does not report
suspected child abuse or neglect”). Indiana Department of Child Services spokesperson
James Wide has been quoted as saying that the Committee’s Opinion “puts the safety of
children at risk.” Indiana Lawyers Say They’re Not Bound to Report Child Abuse, J.
GAZETTE (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/indiana/Indianalawyers-say-they-re-not-bound-to-report-child-abuse-9316910.
57 See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE (N.Y. MacMillan & Co. 1875).
58 For a good discussion of that question, see Mosteller, supra note 14, at 271 nn.
204–05.
59 For an argument in favor of the position that lawyers should not be required to
disclose confidential information under the mandatory reporting statute see Smith, supra
note 52, at 453, 455–57, 458–69 (mandatory reporting undermines the attorney-client
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application of the Statute to lawyers weakens the duty of confidentiality
and the principles upon which it is based. It diminishes the value of the
trust clients have on their lawyers, and affects the attorney-client
relationship by essentially “deputizing” lawyers to monitor their own
clients or to become informants against them. Thus, because protecting the
confidentiality of the information and the attorney-client relationship serves
important legal and social goals, lawyers should not be obligated to
60
disclose confidential information.
Unfortunately, however, the Committee’s position is not supported by
61
the text of the Statute or the Rules. For that reason, those who prefer the
Committee’s view on this issue should work to amend the Statute to reflect
a different public policy. Indiana could, for example, adopt the approach
taken in Illinois, where the mandatory reporting statute holds that the
reporting requirements do not apply to the contents of a privileged
communication between attorneys and their clients or to confidential
information within the meaning of the Illinois Rules of Professional
62
Conduct.
The new statute should also explicitly recognize that the
attorney-client privilege will be available in proceedings in which the Rules
of Evidence apply. Such an approach would better define the proper
privilege, can violate a client’s rights under the Sixth Amendment, and can create a conflict
of interest between the client’s interests and defense counsel’s own interest in complying
with the law).
60 See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 230–31 (“Even if the state is ultimately prohibited
from calling the lawyer as a witness at the client’s trial, the major damage would have been
done, and the promise of secrecy . . . would prove ineffective in facilitating open and free
confiding of sensitive information.” (footnote omitted)).
61 In fact, it can be argued that the proper interpretation of the statute and the rules
leads to the opposite conclusion. See Smith, supra note 52, at 452 (“Because the
communications provided for in the duty of confidentiality encompass the communications
of the attorney-client privilege, one could argue that, by excepting the duty of
confidentiality, Indiana automatically carved out an exception to the attorney-client
privilege.”).
62 See 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2014) (“The reporting requirements of this Act shall
not apply to the contents of a privileged communication between an attorney and his or her
client or to confidential information within the meaning of Rule 1.6 of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct relating to the legal representation of an individual client.”); see also
ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2016). It is important to note how the Illinois statute
covers both information protected by the attorney-client privilege and confidential
information under the rules of professional conduct. If the statute only protected privileged
information, the attorney would still be required to disclose confidential information in
some cases. The privilege only covers information provided by the client to the attorney in
confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal representation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). If the attorney obtains the
information about the child abuse from a third party, or from the client but in the presence of
a third party, the information is confidential but not covered by the privilege. In such a case,
if the statute only covered privileged information, the attorney would have to disclose the
information.

2016]

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS IN INDIANA

37

relationship between the Statute, the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Although this approach does eliminate the
availability of one possible source of information in the efforts to identify
victims of abuse, it also preserves an important, indeed indispensable,
component of our system of justice.
Meanwhile, lawyers should follow a relatively simple four-step
analysis to determine if they can, or must, disclose information obtained
during the course of the representation of a client. First, the lawyer should
determine if the information falls within the definition of confidential
63
information according to the Rules of Professional Conduct. If it does
not, the duty of confidentiality does not apply and the attorney can decide
what to do with, or about, the information. On the other hand, if the
information is confidential, the second step is to determine if there is a duty
to disclose it, whether a statute, court order, or rule of professional conduct
imposes that duty. If there is a duty to disclose, the attorney must disclose
according to that duty. If there is no duty to disclose, the third step is to
determine if there is an exception that allows the attorney to disclose the
information at his or her discretion. If not, then the duty is to keep the
64
information secret. If there is an exception, then the final step is for the
attorney to use his or her discretion and determine whether to disclose
based on a careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages and
possible consequences of disclosure.
Using this relatively straightforward flow-chart-like analysis, lawyers
can always determine how to best apply the duty of confidentiality.
Applied to the question asked by the Ethics Committee in Opinion No. 2 of
2015, the answer should be that, under the current state of the law, lawyers
must abide by the duty imposed by the Statute and, therefore, must disclose
any information that gives them reason to believe that a child is a victim of
abuse or neglect. This is not the ideal result and the law should be
changed. Until that happens, however, given the state of law, it is the
correct result.

63 Section 59 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides the
most commonly used definition. It states that “[c]onfidential client information consists of
information relating to representation of a client, other than information that is generally
known.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
64 If an attorney feels strongly enough that certain information should be disclosed
even though there is a duty to keep the information secret, the attorney can always disclose
the information understanding he or she will have to face the consequences of having
violated an ethical duty.

